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Environmental and Pro-Social Norms: Evidence from 30 Countries 
 
Summary 
The paper investigates the relationship between pro-social norms and its implications 
for improved environmental outcomes, an area which has been neglected in the 
environmental economics literature. We provide empirical evidence, demonstrating a 
strong link between perceived environmental cooperation (reduced public littering) and 
increased voluntary environmental morale, using European Values Survey (EVS) data 
for 30 Western and Eastern European countries. The robust results suggest that 
environmental morale and perceived environmental cooperation, as well as identifying 
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1. Introduction 
In recent times, a growing number of studies have been devoted to examining individual 
environmental preferences. Initial interest in environmental attitudes goes back to the early 
1970s (Bord and O’Connor, 1997). An increasing number of economists have been involved 
in evaluating whether an individual’s environmental morale or attitudes could help to reduce 
environmental degradation or the problems of free riding associated with public goods (Frey 
and Stutzer, 2006). One possible solution is to ‘force’ people to cooperate. This is in line with 
deterrence policy based on the economics-of-crime approach. Expected utility is maximized, 
taking into account the probability of detection and the degree of punishment. However, 
empirical and experimental findings indicate that deterrence models predict too little 
compliance. People are more compliant than these models predict. The level of compliance 
observed cannot be explained by the amount of risk aversion involved. The literature 
suggests that social norms help us to explain the high degree of compliance (Torgler, 2007). 
The high level of individual co-operation has been documented in the experimental literature. 
According to Ochs and Roth (1989) and Roth (1995), a large number of ultimatum 
experiments have shown that the modal offer is (50,50), that the mean offer is somewhere 
around (40,60), and that the smaller the offer, the higher the probability that the offer will be 
rejected. According to Ledyard (1995) and Davis and Holt (1993), public good experiments 
indicate that, on average, subjects contribute between 40 and 60 percent of their endowment 
to a public good.  
 Prevailing social norms thus tend to generate increased individual cooperation in 
public good situations and, in some instances, of private goods as well. Violation of social 
norms has negative consequences, such as internal sanctions (e.g. guilt, remorse) or external 
legal and social sanctions, such as gossip and ostracism. As Polinsky and Shavell (2000) 
point out, the corresponding literature focuses on the influence that social norms have on  
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individual behavior, and their role as a substitute for, or a supplement to, formal laws. Laws 
themselves can influence social norms. Rege and Telle (2001) suggest that social norms may 
explain why many individuals don’t litter public places. If littering is not acceptable in a 
society, a “person throwing his ice-cream-paper on the street will feel social disapproval from 
people observing him… many people do not litter even if they know that nobody is observing 
them, because littering imposes a feeling of guilt” (p. 3). Feelings of guilt or shame restrict 
behavior. 
Many traditional models have treated public cooperation as an isolated case. 
However, subjects do not normally act as isolated individuals playing a game against nature. 
This paper emphasizes the relevance of social context in understanding the willingness of 
individuals to keep the environment clean. The behavior of other citizens is important to 
understand why people comply. As a consequence, theories of pro-social behavior, which 
take the impact of behavior or the preferences of others into account, are promising. The 
concept of pro-social behavior is widely implemented into daily life. For example, 
Vesterlund (2003) reports that charitable organizations have an incentive to ask donors who 
make large contributions to permit the use of their name when a donation is made. Such an 
announcement is likely to have a positive effect on others who have not yet made a 
contribution. It also helps to reduce the problem of free-riding and encourages individuals to 
make larger contributions.  
Individuals may be willing to contribute conditionally, depending on the pro-social 
behavior of others. This applies to an individual’s environmental actions as well. The more 
others are perceived to comply, the more willing individuals are to protect the environment. 
We hypothesize that the extent to which others contribute triggers more or less cooperation 
and systematically influences the willingness to participate in environmental actions or  
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contributions. We use survey data to test whether conditional cooperation can be identified 
for environmental actions as well.  
To our knowledge, our paper provides findings not yet discussed in previous 
environmental research. There is no study that investigates whether conditional cooperation 
is relevant in the environmental economics literature. It remains uncertain whether previous 
results in laboratory experiments or field experiments are directly transferable in a context 
that deals with environmental aspects. The paper also complements previous studies by 
providing evidence outside of a lab setting, using a wide-ranging survey that covers 30 
Western and Eastern European countries.  
Section 2 provides a brief overview of the existing literature on social comparisons. In 
Section 3, we present our theoretical approach and develop our hypotheses. Section 4 
presents the empirical results. In Section 5, we discuss the potential causality problems and 
Section 6 concludes with a summary and discussion of the main results.  
 
2. Overview of the literature  
Several theories have been put forward to explain what constitutes conditional cooperation. 
Most papers in the literature (cf. Rabin, 1998 and Falk and Fehr, 2002) explain conditional 
cooperation in terms of reciprocity. In an environmental context, reciprocity means, for 
example, that if many citizens don’t throw litter in a public place, other individuals would 
feel obliged to do likewise. Several laboratory experimental studies (mainly public good 
experiments) provide evidence on pro-social behavior (for an overview, see Gächter, 2006). 
For example, Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) find that 50 percent of the subjects were 
conditionally cooperative. Falk, Fischbacher and Gächter (2003) create a laboratory situation 
in which each subject is a member of two economically identical groups, where only the 
group members are different. They observe that the same subjects contribute different  
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amounts, depending on the behavior of the group. Contributions are larger when group 
cooperation is higher. 
Alternatively, the concept of conformity (cf. Henrich, 2004) has been used to explain 
conditional cooperation. Conformity refers to the motivation of individuals to fulfill the 
social norms of keeping the environment clean and therefore acting according to society’s 
rules. This concept is less connected to incentives and benefits than is reciprocity. In this 
case, individuals would contribute, even if the good in question does not benefit anyone, as 
long as it is perceived that a sufficient number of individuals are contributing (Bardsley and 
Sausgruber, 2006).   
While several early studies provide evidence of conditional cooperation within a 
laboratory setting, an increasing number of studies have been conducted to check the validity 
of such studies outside of a laboratory setting. Frey and Meier (2004a) provide field 
experimental evidence of conditional cooperation. They analyze students’ decisions 
regarding contributions to two social funds administered by the University of Zurich. Their 
study shows that, when more individuals expect others to cooperate, they are more willing to 
cooperate. In another study, Frey and Meier (2004b) observe that the strongest reaction to 
information about others’ behavior is observed in students who are uncertain whether or not 
to contribute to two Public Funds at their University. Heldt (2005) conducts a natural field 
experiment on conditional cooperation, in which cross-country skiers in two Swedish ski 
resorts are faced with the decision of whether or not to contribute to ski track funding. The 
results suggest that the percentage of subjects making a contribution is higher when they 
know that a higher percentage of individuals are making a contribution. Shang and Croson 
(2005) conducted a field experiment at an anonymous public radio station during an on-air 
fundraising campaign to investigate the influence of social information on the size of an 
individual’s contribution. The results indicate that social information does indeed influence  
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contributions. Martin and Randal (2005) conducted another natural field experiment at an art 
gallery. Admission was free, but a donation could be placed in a transparent box in the foyer. 
The results showed that visitors donate significantly more when there is already some money 
in the box. 
The study of pro-social behavior resulting from perceived public cooperation is an 
area that has largely been ignored in the environmental economics literature, despite its 
potential to affect environmental outcomes. The connection between perceived 
environmental cooperation of other individuals and environmental morale or preferences has 
not yet been studied in the environmental economics literature. In contrast, studies linking 
improved environmental behavior, or higher willingness to pay for environmental 
preservation with education, knowledge, environmental awareness and prior experience are 
well established in the environmental economics literature (cf. Tisdell and Wilson, 2001). 
This may be explained by the unavailability of quality survey data, although the concept itself 
may not be new to researchers in environmental economics. For the first time, the European 
Value Survey (EVS) provides quality survey data, asking the relevant questions to enable this 
study to be undertaken. 
Pro-social behavior occurs voluntarily. Such behavior is not only linked with public 
goods but also with particular private goods. The crucial feature here is that an individual acts 
according to the way the majority of the public is acting, and not because he or she benefits 
directly from such action. Hence, any strategies to increase pro-social behavior have the 
potential to improve environmental and social outcomes in a cost effective manner.  
In everyday life, there are many environmental outcomes that can be improved 
through enhanced pro-social actions. We demonstrate the relationship between an 
individual’s perceptions of the public not throwing away litter in public places and an 
increase in the individual’s willingness to also protect the environment. Other areas where  
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such behavior is useful are, for example, conserving energy and water, contributing to 
environmental conservation, reducing car pollution and other forms of pollution, engaging in 
wildlife friendly gardening, becoming members of environmental organizations and taking 
part in working bees. In fact, the number of environmental activities that can benefit from 
pro-social behavior is endless. 
This study looks at the disposal of litter to examine whether individual behavior is 
influenced by their perception of how other people behave. Despite litter in public places 
being recognized as a major public health and safety hazard and diminishing the aesthetic 
appearance of public places (cf. TAckerman, 1997T), few studies have focused on dealing with 
this issue. Litter and unkempt lawns have also been linked with crime (cf. Brown et al., 
2004). Existing studies examine the role that education can play in reducing public litter (cf. 
Taylor et al., 2007), and the instruments (e.g. taxes, fines, charges and market incentives) that 
can be used to minimize the problem of public littering (cf. Fullerton and Wolverton, 2000;T 
Ackerman, 1997; Dobbs, 1991T). One study (Kinnaman and Fullerton, 1994), dealing with 
garbage recycling, examines why some households participate in curbside recycling 
programs, even in the absence of a user fee; why other households do not participate, even in 
the presence of a user fee; and why some households choose to litter while others do not. 
However, that paper deals with user fees and does not address the issue of conditional 
cooperation in littering behavior. 
 
3. Empirical approach  
3.1 Data set 
In contrast to experimental studies, this paper uses survey data provided by the European 
Values Survey (EVS) 1999/2000, which is a European-wide investigation of socio-cultural 
and political change. The survey collects data on the basic values and beliefs of people  
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throughout Europe. The EVS was first carried out from 1981 to 1983, then in 1990 to 1991 
and again in 1999 through 2001, with an increasing number of countries participating over 
time. The methodological approach is explained in detail in the European Values Survey 
(1999) source book, which provides information on response rates, the stages of sampling 
procedures, the translation of the questionnaire, and field work, along with measures of 
coding reliability, reliability of data, and data checks. All country surveys are conducted by 
experienced professional survey organizations, with the exception of Greece. Interviews are 
face-to-face and those interviewed are adult citizens aged 18 years and older. Tilburg 
University coordinates the project and provides the guidelines to guarantee the use of 
standardized information in the surveys and the national representativeness of the data. To 
avoid framing biases, the questions are asked in a prescribed order. The response rates vary 
from country to country.  However, the average response rate is around 60 percent.  
Because EVS asks an identical set of questions in various European countries, the 
survey provides a unique opportunity to examine the impact of conditional cooperation on 
environmental morale and preferences. This paper considers 30 representative national 
samples of at least 1,000 individuals in each country. The survey permits us to work with a 
representative set of individuals, covering a large set of countries. The data allows us to 
complement previous laboratory and field experiments with survey studies to demonstrate the 
existence of conditional cooperation. 
  
3.2 Dependent variables and conditional cooperation 
To check the robustness of results, we use two dependent variables. The first measures an 
individual’s willingness to keep public places free from litter. This variable is identified as (a 
particular case of) environmental morale. To assess the level of environmental morale, we 
use the following question:   
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Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it is always 
justified, never justified, or somewhere in between: … Throwing away litter in a 
public place.  
 
A ten-scale index is used for this question, with the two extremes being ‘never justified’ and 
‘always justified’. The natural cut-off point is the value 1, where a high amount of 
respondents assert that throwing away litter in a public place is ‘never justified’ (68.3 
percent). Thus, our environmental morale variable takes the value 1 if the respondent says 
that throwing away litter in a public place is ‘never justified’, and zero otherwise.  
The second variable is an index on environmental preferences, covering the following 
two survey questions: 
I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to 
prevent environmental pollution (0=strongly disagree, 3=strongly agree) 
 
I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent 
environmental pollution (0=strongly disagree, 3=strongly agree) 
 
The index adds the values of both questions, which gives total values between 0 and 6.  
In general, the EVS has been designed as a wide-ranging survey, where the danger of 
framing effects is reduced compared to many other surveys that focus entirely on 
environmental questions. The available data are based on self-reports, so that subjects may 
tend to overstate their degree of cooperation. However, the questions are not free of 
problems. The first question does not cover the multidimensional aspect of environmental 
responsibility. People may have another sense of responsibility with respect to aspects such  
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as energy conservation or recycling. In addition, one can argue that littering may be 
influenced by the knowledge or the perceptions that littering is illegal and subject to fines. 
The survey does not provide any further information about individuals’ deterrence 
perceptionsT
1
T. In addition, the level of improvement in environmental quality is not clearly 
stated in our index on environmental preferences. Hence, people do not know exactly how 
much they have to pay for a particular improvementT
2
T. The consequences of taxation are not 
mentioned either (first question). No information is provided as to how much the income or 
value added taxes, or other taxes, are supposed to be increased. It is thus unclear who will 
have to bear the highest tax burden. While unspecified payment schemes increase the 
variance, they may influence the willingness to contribute (Witzke and Urfei, 2001). 
However, an unspecified statement still helps in measuring environmental preferences and 
the value attributed to reduce strategic behavior by influencing the quantity or quality of 
environmental goods. People may intentionally indicate a false willingness to contribute in 
order to match their own preferences (Hidano et al., 2005). When neither specific goods nor 
quantitative values are used, the attributes of the environmental goods in question need not be 
thoroughly explained to ensure that respondents understand and respond by stating their 
willingness to accept an increase in taxes or to give away part of their incomeT
3
T.  
We use the following question as an independent variable to investigate the impact of 
conditional cooperation. 
 “According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following: Throwing away 
litter in a public place?” (4=almost all, 1=almost none) 
                                                 
TP
1
PT An alternative would be to use official fines as a proxy. Unfortunately, we were not able to collect this 
information in our cross-country setting.  
TP
2
PT It has been shown that the preferences to protect the environment (regarding causes and consequences of 
environmental damages) depend on the level of information included in the questionnaire (Bulte et al., 2005). 
TP
3
PT For a detailed discussion regarding possible survey biases, see Carson and Mitchell (1995).  
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In general, we observe an increased interest among economists to use survey data. For 
example, research that deals with social capital, corruption, happiness and tax compliance 
explore the causes of attitudes using other attitudinal variables as independent factors (cf. 
Diener and Suh, 2000; Brewer and Steenbergen, 2002; Uslaner, 2004; Brewer et al., 2004; 
and Chang and Chu, 2006 and Torgler, 2007). In this paper, we investigate the correlation 
between perceived compliance and environmental morale or attitudes in a multivariate 
analysis controlling for other factors in order to better isolate the relationship. A specification 
based on multivariate analysis has the obvious advantage of presenting a more balanced view 
of the role of conditional cooperation by separating the effects of other exogenous variables. 
However, if conditional cooperation differs systematically in some other way that also affects 
the willingness to cooperate, the results could be misleading.  
 
4. Econometric results 
Our multivariate analysis includes a vector of control variables. Previous research in 
environmental economics and social norms demonstrates the relevance to consider socio-
demographic and socio-economic variables along with the level of church attendance, formal 
and informal education and participation in an environmental organization (cf. Torgler and 
Garcia-Valiñas, 2007; Torgler, 2007).  In addition, a further variable is used to identify a 
potential conditional cooperative effect, namely individuals’ interest in othersT
4
T. The question 
measures how individuals experience their environment. We differentiate between two 
different regions of Europe (i.e. Western and Eastern Europe) because of the reform process 
in the transition countries. The rapid collapse of institutional structures in Eastern European 
countries produced a vacuum in many, if not all, of these countries. This led to large social 
                                                 
TP
4
PT Question: People should stick to their own affairs and not show too much interest in what others say or do 
(1=agree strongly, 5=disagree strongly).   
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costs, especially in terms of worsening income inequalities, increasing poverty and poor 
institutional conditions resulting from uncertainty and high transaction costs. Torgler (2003) 
and Alm et al. (2006) show that such circumstances have an impact on social norms.  
Table 1 presents the first results of the multivariate analysis. In these first estimates, 
we exclude income. This is because the ten-point income scale in the EVS is based on 
national currencies, which reduces the possibility of comparing nations in a cross-country 
comparison.T
5
T The self-classification of the respondents’ economic situation into various 
economic classes may be used as a proxy. However, data for this purpose has not been 
collected in all countries. Thus, we include economic status sequentially in the specification 
(see Table 2). In general, a probit estimation is appropriate when working with our first 
dependent variable (ENVIRONMENTAL MORALE) and an ordered probit model when 
using our INDEX OF ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES to take into account the ranking 
information of the scaled dependent variables. To measure the quantitative effect of this 
variable, we calculate the marginal effects, because the equation is nonlinear. Marginal 
effects indicate the change in the probability of individuals having a specific level of 
environmental morale/preferences when the independent variable increases by one unit. For 
simplicity, the marginal effects in all the estimations are presented for the highest value only. 
In addition, we present ordinary least squares estimations for our second dependent variable, 
providing beta or standardized regression coefficients to indicate the relative importance of 
conditional cooperation compared to the other variables used. Weighted estimates are 
conducted to make the samples correspond to the national distribution.T
6
T Furthermore, answers 
such as ‘don’t know’ and missing values are eliminated in all estimations. 
                                                 
TP
5




PT The weighting variable is provided by the EVS.   
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Consistent with our main hypothesis, the estimation results in Table 1 indicate that the 
lower the perceived environmental cooperation of other persons (higher values of the 
variable), the lower the environmental morale. In all three regressions, the coefficient 
PERCEIVED ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION is statistically significant. Overall, the 
size of the effect is substantial in the first regression; if the perceived lack of cooperation 
rises by one unit, the percentage of persons reporting highest environmental morale falls by 
2.3 percentage points (specification 1). Not surprisingly, the quantitative effects are lower, 
but still visible, when using the index of environmental preferences. The index measures the 
multidimensional aspect of environmental pollution. As Table 2 indicates, the results remain 
robust when including the proxies for individuals’ economic situation.  
Looking at the other variables, we observe that being active in an environmental 
organization has a positive effect on both dependent variables, with marginal effects between 
4.0 and 9.3 percentage points. Moreover, being interested in others is also positively 
correlated with environmental morale and preferences. Consistent results can also be found 
for CHURCH ATTENDANCET
7
T. In all cases, the coefficient is positively correlated with our 
dependent variables. This supports the argument that churches can act as social norm 
enforcers (cf. Torgler 2006).  
The results obtained using the variable INDEX ENVIRONMENTAL 
PREFERENCES is consistent with the literature on environmental attitudes and preferences. 
Several studies stress that age is negatively correlated with the willingness to contribute to 
additional environmental protection, since older people are unlikely to enjoy the long-term 
                                                 
TP
7
PT Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, how often do you attend religious services these days? More 
than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, less often, practically 
never or never (8= more than once a week to 1=practically never or never). 
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benefits of preserving resources (Whitehead, 1991; Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2000). 
Our results also indicate a negative correlation between age and environmental preferences. 
The reference group (AGE below 30 years) has the strongest environmental preferences and 
the marginal effects increase consistently for higher age groups.  
In a meta-study, Zelezny et al. (2000) find strong evidence that environmentalism 
does not begin in adulthood, which contradicts the statement that gender differences arise due 
to motherhood and child protection. Regardless of age, women show more concern for the 
environment than men. In our analysis, we observe strong gender differences. Being a 
woman rather than a man increases the probability of reporting the highest environmental 
preferences by 0.6 percentage points (see Table 1). The beta coefficients indicate a strong 
quantitative effect relative to other variables.  
Regarding educational issues, the literature shows that formal educationT
8
T has a 
significant positive influence on environmental willingness to contribute (Blomquist and 
Whitehead, 1998; Engel and Pötschke, 1998; Witzke and Urfei, 2001; Veisten et al., 2004). 
On the other hand, informal education is also important (Whitehead, 1991; Blomquist and 
Whitehead, 1998; Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2000; Hidano et al., 2005). Well-
informed citizens are more aware of environmental issues and problems and have stronger 
environmental attitudes, because they are more knowledgeable about the possible damage 
(Danielson et al., 1995; Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas, 2007). The strength of formal and 
informal education is also visible in Tables 1 and 2T
9
T. All respective coefficients are 
statistically significant and show considerable quantitative effects.  
                                                 
TP
8
PT Formal education is usually expressed as the level of education or degrees a person has obtained. It can 
alternatively be expressed as the number of years spent in education (Blomquist and Whitehead, 1998).  
TP
9
PT Formal education: At what age did you complete or will you complete your full time education, either at 
school or at an institution of higher education? Please exclude apprenticeships. Informal education/political  
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The economic situation of an individual is also a significant aspect (Whitehead, 1991; 
Stevens et al., 1994; Blomquist and Whitehead, 1998; Popp, 2001; Witzke and Urfei, 2001; 
Bulte et al., 2005; Dupont, 2004; Veisten et al., 2004; Hidano et al., 2005). These studies 
show a positive relationship between income and a preference to contribute to environmental 
causes. Our study also points to a positive relationship between lower income classes and 
lower environmental values. However, the marginal effects for the variables UPPER CLASS 
and MIDDLE CLASS are similar.  
In line with Veisten et al. (2004), unemployed people are found to have lower 
preferences for environmental protection. Finally, marital status might influence 
environmental attitudes as well. It can be argued that married people are more compliant or 
more concerned about environmental degradation than others, especially compared to singles. 
They are more constrained by their social network and are often strongly involved with the 
community (Tittle, 1980). This argument also holds true when focusing on moral attitudes or, 
in our case, environmental morale. Overall, the estimates indicate a tendency for married 
individuals to have relatively high environmental preferences and high levels of 
environmental morale, although the differences are not always statistically significant.  
In general, the results on environmental morale are in line with the literature on social 
norms or morality, such as tax morale (cf. Torgler, 2007). Age is positively correlated with 
environmental morale and the economic situation is negatively correlated. Consistent with 
the literature on environmental preferences, a gender effect is observable. Education is 
statistically significant in Table 1. However, once the economic situation of the individual is 
controlled for, the coefficient is insignificant.  
                                                                                                                                                        
discussion:  When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, 
occasionally or never (3=frequently, 2=occasionally, 1=never)?   
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In sum, the first two tables provide evidence to demonstrate the existence of 
individual conditional cooperation in relation to environmental issues.  
 
5. Causality 
Causality remains an issue, because one’s own attitudes may lead to the expectation that 
others behave in the same way. However, results from ‘strategy method’ experiments 
conducted by Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2006) suggest that 
causality goes from beliefs about others’ cheating to one’s own behavior rather than vice 
versa. The EVS is not a panel survey. A survey that follows individuals over time would help 
us to study the dynamics of adjustment more deeply. The question referring to conditional 
cooperation was only asked in the last EVS of 1999 through 2001. Longitudinal data would 
help us to reduce problems caused by unobserved individual heterogeneity. In this section, 
we present two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations for both dependent variables in order 
to deal with the causality problem. We try to filter out a possible systematic bias in our 
conditional cooperative behavior by correcting for differences between what an individual 
thinks and what that individual projects on others. This provides the possibility of minimizing 
potential bias.  
Table 3 reports the results of two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations together with 
the first stage regressions. The instruments used are individuals’ interest in friendsT
10
T, an index 
of perceived honestyT
11
T and a dummy variable that measures whether an individual has or had 
children. Table 3 shows that the instruments and the F-tests for the instrument exclusion set 
                                                 
TP
10
PT Please say how important each of the following is in your life… friends and acquaintances (4=very important, 
1=not at all).  
TP
11
PT  Index covering the sum of the following questions: According to you (on a scale from 1 to 4), how many of 
your compatriots: (1) Pay cash for services to avoid taxes?(2) Go over the speed limit in built-up areas?   
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in the first-stage regression are statistically significant. Consistent with our main hypothesis, 
the estimation results indicate that the lower the perceived environmental cooperation of 
other persons, the lower the environmental morale and environmental preferences. 
Table 4 uses yet another approach to deal with a potential endogeneity problem. It 
filters out a possible bias in the conditional cooperative effort. A causality problem may arise 
because an individual’s willingness to cooperate or protect the environment (high 
environmental morale or preferences) could lead to the expectation that others would also 
behave in the same way. Thus, individuals with a higher environmental morale or preferences 
have a lower perception of others not cooperating or contributing. To deal with this 
possibility, the first step is to calculate the average perceived environmental cooperation for 
each country. The next step is to calculate the average perceived environmental cooperation 
in each country for individuals having the highest environmental moraleT
12
T or environmental 
preferences. In a further step, the difference between the two average values is considered. 
These values may measure a particular bias in perceived environmental cooperation due to 
the level of environmental morale or preferences. This bias is then added to the individual 
values of the group with the highest environmental morale and preferences. As a 
consequence, the values between the group with higher and lower environmental morale and 
preferences are brought closer to together, depending on the perceived environmental 
cooperation in each country. This procedure may help to better isolate the existence of a 
conditional cooperative effect. Table 4 presents the results for the filtered perceived 
environmental cooperation variable. The results remain robust. Only in specification (10) do 
we observe that the z-value is below the 10 percent level. However, once the economic 
situation of the individual is included in the specification, the coefficient remains statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level and similar marginal effects are obtained.  
                                                 
TP
12
PT Value 1, stressing that throwing away litter in a public place is never justifiable.  
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6. Conclusions  
This paper investigates whether perceived environmental cooperation by the public is an 
important determinant of explaining environmental morale and environmental preferences of 
individuals. Our hypothesis is that an individual’s behavior is likely to be influenced by their 
perception of the behavior of other citizens. For example, if an individual believes that 
throwing litter in a public place is common, then the environmental morale or preference of 
the individual decreases. Alternatively, if an individual believes others to be compliant, then 
the environmental morale/preference increases. Using recent EVS data for Western and 
Eastern European countries, we find strong empirical support for the hypothesis. The results 
remain robust using 11 different specifications and after dealing with potential causality 
issues.  
By investigating the public’s littering and environmental preferences, the paper 
underlines the importance of using a rich set of theories to fully understand what influences 
people’s willingness to contribute towards improving outcomes. Individuals indeed do not act 
in isolation.  
To our knowledge, this is the first study of this nature demonstrating the relationship 
between perceived environmental cooperation of others and the environmental morale in the 
form of not littering public places and willingness to protect the environment. This 
relationship can be used to bring about positive environmental outcomes in other areas. The 
interesting and attractive feature of this behavior is its voluntary nature. Such behavior is not 
only cost effective but can be more effective in areas where law enforcement and market 
incentives fail. The results of the study have implications for both developed and developing 
countries. In developing countries, for example, there is a major problem with litter in public 
places. City councils spend large sums of money to clean up litter. Heavy fines and strict law  
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enforcement have been tried to discourage littering, without much success. Hence, the results 
of this study should be useful for decision-makers as well. 
Understanding what shapes environmental morale and preferences needs to be 
investigated further. Only a limited number of studies have explored the relevance of social 
interactions. A good understanding of the interactions between environmental morale and 
preferences and perceived environmental cooperation, and the factors strengthening these 
relationships, has the potential to bring about better environmental outcomes.  
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ENVIRONMENTAL AND CONDITIONAL COOPERATION 
 
   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg. 
Effects 
Coeff. z-Stat.  Marg. 
Effects 
Coeff. t-Stat. 





INDEX ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES 
Robust standard errors  Robust standard errors  Robust standard 
errors 
DEPENDENT V. 
(1)  (2) (3) 
PERCEIVED ENVIRON. 
COOPERATION 
-0.065*** -6.19 -0.023  -0.015*  -1.71  -0.002  -0.010*  -1.66 
INTERESTED IN OTHERS  0.010***  9.04  0.003  0.020***  21.74  0.002  0.142***  21.85 
Voluntary Organization                
ENVIRON. ORGANIZATION  0.114***  3.16  0.040  0.540***  18.94  0.093  0.108***  19.53 
Demographic Factors                
AGE 30-39  0.099***  3.59  0.035  -0.045**  -2  -0.005  -0.018**  -2.17 
AGE 40-49  0.159***  5.41  0.056  -0.075***  -3.09  -0.009  -0.029***  -3.32 
AGE 50-59  0.219***  6.8  0.075  -0.119***  -4.54  -0.014  -0.042***  -4.8 
AGE 60-69  0.269***  6.74  0.091  -0.119***  -3.64  -0.013  -0.039***  -3.84 
AGE 70+  0.237***  5.01  0.080  -0.184***  -4.76  -0.020  -0.050***  -5.01 
WOMAN 0.089***  5.03  0.032  0.046***  3.2  0.006  0.021***  3.21 
Formal and Informal Educ.                
EDUCATION -0.001  -0.67  0.000  0.023***  17.02  0.003  0.106***  17.42 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION  -0.036***  -2.84  -0.013  0.150***  13.86  0.018  0.091***  14.02 
Marital Status                
WIDOWED -0.037  -1.09  -0.013  -0.106***  -3.82  -0.012  -0.026***  -3.77 
DIVORCED -0.083***  -2.65  -0.030  -0.064**  -2.37  -0.007  -0.015**  -2.45 
SEPARATED -0.102  -1.64  -0.037  -0.019  -0.36  -0.002  -0.002  -0.4 
NEVER MARRIED  -0.113***  -4.55  -0.041  -0.048**  -2.31  -0.006  -0.019**  -2.37 
Employment Status                
PART TIME EMPLOYEE  -0.128***  -3.95  -0.047  0.032  1.21  0.004  0.007  1.16 
SELFEMPLOYED 0.048  1.36  0.017  0.069**  2.54  0.009  0.015**  2.57 
UNEMPLOYED 0.106***  3.18  0.037  -0.100***  -3.66  -0.012  -0.039***  -3.83 
AT HOME  0.176***  5.34  0.060  -0.015  -0.59  -0.002  -0.005  -0.71 
STUDENT -0.158***  -3.89  -0.058  0.091***  2.8  0.012  0.018***  2.74 
RETIRED 0.010  0.33  0.004  -0.134***  -4.87  -0.015  -0.034***  -5.12 
OTHER 0.091  1.44  0.032  0.011  0.21  0.001  0.001  0.13 
Religiosity                
CHURCH ATTENDANCE  0.010***  3.01  0.004  0.011***  4  0.001  0.028***  4.59 
REGIONS YES        YES        YES    
Pseudo R2  0.024       0.026       0.086    
Number of observations  32433       30691       30691    
Prob > chi2 / Prob > F  0.000        0.000        0.000    
Notes: The reference group consists of AGE<30, MAN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The 
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Table 2 
FURTHER SPECIFICATION INCLUDING THE ECONOMIC SITUATION 
 




Coeff. z-Stat.  Marg. 
Effects 
Coeff. t-Stat. 





INDEX ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES 
  
Robust standard errors  Robust standard errors  Robust standard errors 
DEPENDENT V. 
(4)  (5) (6) 
PERCEIVED ENVIRON. 
COOPERATION 
-0.044*** -2.96 -0.016  -0.028**  -2.32  -0.003  -0.020**  -2.35 
INTERESTED IN OTHERS  0.006***  4.30  0.002  0.021***  16.01  0.002  0.148***  16.32 
Voluntary Organization               
ENVIRON. ORGANIZATION  0.099*  1.82  0.035  0.498***  11.37  0.079  0.093***  11.65 
Demographic Factors               
AGE 30-39  0.082**  2.14  0.029  -0.080**  -2.58  -0.009  -0.033***  -2.81 
AGE 40-49  0.145***  3.47  0.050  -0.114***  -3.41  -0.012  -0.045***  -3.70 
AGE 50-59  0.199***  4.45  0.069  -0.133***  -3.67  -0.014  -0.048***  -3.99 
AGE 60-69  0.166***  3.00  0.057  -0.124***  -2.78  -0.013  -0.042***  -3.02 
AGE 70+  0.033  0.51  0.012  -0.163***  -3.13  -0.017  -0.046***  -3.42 
WOMAN  0.029 1.15  0.010  0.004  0.19  0.000  0.002 0.21 
Formal and Informal Educ.               
EDUCATION -0.006**  -2.27  -0.002  0.024***  10.60  0.003  0.101***  10.85 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION  -0.038  -1.04  -0.014  0.205***  6.96  0.026  0.065***  6.93 
Income               
UPPER CLASS  -0.115***  -4.36  -0.041  0.084***  4.01  0.010  0.037***  4.11 
MIDDLE CLASS  -0.041**  -2.29  -0.015  0.110***  7.20  0.012  0.067***  7.36 
Marital Status               
WIDOWED  -0.009 -0.19  -0.003  -0.053  -1.36  -0.006  -0.012 -1.33 
DIVORCED  -0.149*** -3.12 -0.055  -0.115***  -2.69  -0.012  -0.025*** -2.82 
SEPARATED -0.168*  -1.87  -0.062  0.038  0.49  0.004  0.004  0.45 
NEVER MARRIED  -0.077**  -2.19  -0.028  -0.076**  -2.59  -0.008  -0.030***  -2.71 
Employment Status               
PART TIME EMPLOYEE  -0.050  -1.01  -0.018  0.035  0.89  0.004  0.008  0.86 
SELFEMPLOYED  0.112** 2.28  0.039  0.074**  2.03  0.009 0.017** 2.13 
UNEMPLOYED 0.196***  4.31  0.068  -0.080**  -2.18  -0.009  -0.032**  -2.32 
AT HOME  0.252***  5.72  0.086  0.073**  2.12  0.009  0.021**  2.08 
STUDENT -0.124**  -2.06  -0.045  0.054  1.15  0.006  0.011  1.22 
RETIRED -0.014  -0.29  -0.005  -0.095**  -2.32  -0.010  -0.023**  -2.50 
OTHER 0.049  0.58  0.017  -0.025  -0.40  -0.003  -0.004  -0.46 
Religiosity               
CHURCH  ATTENDANCE  0.021*** 4.87 0.008  0.015***  4.31  0.002  0.041*** 4.94 
REGIONS YES        YES        YES    
Pseudo R2  0.023      0.029      0.099 0.023 
Number of observations  16987       16305      16305    
Prob > chi2 / Prob > F  0.000        0.000        0.000    
Notes: The reference group consists of AGE<30, MAN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, LOWEST CLASS, 








 Coeff.  t-Stat.  Coeff.  t-Stat.  Coeff. t-Stat.  Coeff. t-Stat. 
   WEIGHTED 2SLS  FIRST STAGE 
REGRESSION 
WEIGHTED 2SLS  FIRST STAGE 
REGRESSION 
DEPENDENT V.  ENVIRONMENTAL MORALE 
(7) 




-0.022*** -2.74      -0.028***  -3.28    
INTERESTED IN OTHERS  0.003***  8.77  0.001**  2.42  0.008***  17.91  0.001**  2.54 
Voluntary Organization              
ENVIRON. 
ORGANIZATION 
0.038*** 3.05  -0.065*** -3.74  0.196***  14.58  -0.065*** -3.68 
Demographic Factors              
AGE  30-39  0.031*** 2.97  -0.061*** -4.58  -0.012  -1.08  -0.067*** -4.91 
AGE  40-49  0.057*** 5.08  -0.059*** -4.10  -0.017  -1.45  -0.059*** -4.02 
AGE  50-59  0.073*** 6.16  -0.042*** -2.71  -0.031**  -2.47  -0.043*** -2.68 
AGE  60-69  0.090*** 6.38  -0.073*** -3.76  -0.030*  -1.90  -0.078*** -3.92 
AGE  70+  0.073*** 4.35  -0.082*** -3.60  -0.050*** -2.72  -0.084*** -3.56 
WOMAN 0.033***  5.03  0.049***  5.71  0.018**  2.54  0.046***  5.26 
Formal and Informal Educ.              
EDUCATION -0.001  -1.16  0.001  0.88  0.008***  11.80  0.001  1.04 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION  -0.012**  -2.52  -0.022***  -3.44  0.051***  10.05  -0.023***  -3.52 
Marital Status              
WIDOWED -0.015  -1.26  -0.008  -0.51  -0.036***  -2.77  -0.010  -0.61 
DIVORCED -0.035***  -2.96  0.010  0.64  -0.027**  -2.16  0.014  0.84 
SEPARATED -0.033  -1.46  0.055*  1.78  0.014  0.55  0.062*  1.94 
NEVER MARRIED  -0.045***  -4.77  0.023*  1.91  -0.023**  -2.40  0.023*  1.82 
Employment Status              
PART TIME EMPLOYEE  -0.043***  -3.44  0.012  0.76  0.002  0.17  0.008  0.48 
SELFEMPLOYED  0.020  1.52  0.020 1.19  0.011 0.84  0.011 0.65 
UNEMPLOYED 0.044***  3.91  0.034**  2.16  -0.036***  -2.77  0.030*  1.81 
AT HOME  0.057***  5.05  0.035**  2.29  0.003  0.25  0.028*  1.79 
STUDENT  -0.063***  -3.84 0.062*** 3.16  0.055*** 3.29  0.064*** 3.14 
RETIRED 0.002  0.16  0.000  -0.01  -0.044***  -3.48  0.000  0.01 
OTHER 0.039*  1.74  -0.019  -0.67  0.001  0.02  -0.004  -0.12 
Religiosity              
CHURCH ATTENDANCE  0.004***  3.26  0.007***  4.25  0.001  1.07  0.007***  4.24 
REGIONS YES     YES     YES     YES 
Instruments               
Interest in friends      0.021*** 3.49      0.023*** 3.81 
Index perceived honesty      0.323*** 96.18      0.323*** 93.87 
Children     0.073*** 4.87      0.082*** 5.27 
Test of excluded instruments      0.000        0.000  
Centered R2  0.031        0.051       
Number of observations  29733         28349     
Prob > F  0.000           0.000          
Notes: The reference group consists of AGE<30, MAN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The 
symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 4 
FILTERED PERCEIVED ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 
   Coeff.  z-Stat.  Marg. 
Effects 
Coeff. z-Stat.  Marg. 
Effects 
Coeff. z-Stat.  Marg. 
Effects 






INDEX ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES 
Robust standard errors  Robust standard errors  Robust standard errors 
DEPENDENT V. 




-0.043***  -4.10  -0.015 -0.009  -1.05  -0.001 -0.022*  -1.81  -0.002 
INTERESTED IN OTHERS  0.010***  9.05  0.003  0.020***  21.74  0.002  0.021***  16.03  0.002 
Voluntary Organization               
Environ.  Organization  0.116***  3.21  0.040 0.541*** 18.96 0.093 0.498*** 11.37 0.079 
Demographic Factors               
AGE  30-39  0.101***  3.67  0.036 -0.044** -1.97 -0.005  -0.080** -2.57 -0.009 
AGE  40-49  0.162***  5.50  0.056 -0.074***  -3.06 -0.009  -0.114***  -3.40 -0.012 
AGE  50-59  0.222***  6.90  0.076 -0.118***  -4.51 -0.013  -0.132***  -3.65 -0.014 
AGE  60-69  0.274***  6.85  0.093 -0.118***  -3.60 -0.013  -0.123***  -2.76 -0.013 
AGE  70+  0.242***  5.12  0.082 -0.183***  -4.73 -0.020  -0.162***  -3.12 -0.016 
WOMAN  0.088***  5.00  0.032 0.045*** 3.19  0.006 0.004  0.18  0.000 
Formal and Informal Educ.               
EDUCATION  -0.001  -0.67  0.000 0.023*** 17.01 0.003 0.024*** 10.60 0.003 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION  -0.036***  -2.81  -0.013  0.150***  13.87  0.018  0.110***  7.20  0.012 
Income               
UPPER  CLASS           0.206***  6.96  0.026 
MIDDLE  CLASS           0.084***  4.01  0.010 
Marital Status               
WIDOWED  -0.037  -1.08  -0.013 -0.106*** -3.82  -0.012 -0.053  -1.35  -0.006 
DIVORCED -0.083***  -2.65  -0.030  -0.064** -2.37 -0.007  -0.115***  -2.69 -0.012 
SEPARATED  -0.102*  -1.65  -0.037 -0.019  -0.36  -0.002 0.038  0.48  0.004 
NEVER MARRIED  -0.113***  -4.58  -0.041  -0.048** -2.32 -0.006  -0.076** -2.59 -0.008 
Employment Status               
PART TIME EMPLOYEE  -0.128***  -3.96  -0.047  0.032  1.20  0.004  0.035  0.88  0.004 
SELFEMPLOYED  0.048  1.34  0.017 0.069**  2.53  0.009 0.074**  2.03  0.009 
UNEMPLOYED  0.104***  3.14  0.037 -0.100***  -3.67 -0.012  -0.081** -2.18 -0.009 
AT HOME  0.175***  5.33  0.060  -0.015  -0.59  -0.002  0.073**  2.11  0.009 
STUDENT  -0.159***  -3.92  -0.059  0.090***  2.79 0.012  0.053  1.14 0.006 
RETIRED  0.011  0.36  0.004 -0.134***  -4.86 -0.015  -0.095** -2.32 -0.010 
OTHER  0.092  1.45  0.032 0.011  0.21  0.001 -0.026  -0.40 -0.003 
Religiosity               
CHURCH  ATTENDANCE 0.010***  2.97  0.004 0.011*** 3.98  0.001 0.015*** 4.30  0.002 
REGIONS YES        YES        YES      
Pseudo R2  0.023       0.026       0.051     
Number of observations  32433       30691       16305     
Prob > chi2   0.000        0.000        0.000       
Notes: The reference group consists of AGE<30, MAN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, LOWEST CLASS, 
EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
  







Western European Countries  Eastern European Countries 
Germany   Belarus 
Austria Bulgaria 
Belgium Croatia 
Denmark Czech  Republic 
Finland Estonia 
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VARIABLES Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
ENVIRONMENTAL MORALE  40674  0.683  0.465  0  1 
INDEX ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES  38071  3.034  1.598  0  6 
PERCEIVED ENVIRONMENTAL 
COOPERATION 37437  2.710  0.777  1  4 
INTERESTED IN OTHERS  38473 2.635  1.167  1  5 
INDEX CONCERN FOR THE SOCIETY  38540 34.864  7.727  11 55 
ENVIRON. ORGANIZATION  41125 0.049  0.216  0  1 
AGE 30-39  40963 0.197  0.398  0  1 
AGE 40-49  40963 0.191  0.393  0  1 
AGE 50-59  40963 0.150  0.357  0  1 
AGE 60-69  40963 0.135  0.342  0  1 
AGE 70+  40963 0.102  0.302  0  1 
WOMAN  41114 0.540  0.498  0  1 
EDUCATION 39840  18.712  5.125  5  74 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION  40713 1.886  0.654  1  3 
UPPER CLASS  21335  0.136  0.343  0  1 
MIDDLE CLASS  21335  0.338  0.473  0  1 
WIDOWED  39861 0.097  0.295  0  1 
DIVORCED  39861 0.070  0.256  0  1 
SEPARATED  39861 0.016  0.124  0  1 
NEVER MARRIED  39861 0.228  0.420  0  1 
PART TIME EMPLOYEE  40919 0.068  0.252  0  1 
SELFEMPLOYED  40919 0.052  0.222  0  1 
UNEMPLOYED  40919 0.229  0.420  0  1 
AT HOME  40919 0.095  0.293  0  1 
STUDENT  40919 0.061  0.240  0  1 
RETIRED  40919 0.073  0.261  0  1 
OTHER  40919 0.018  0.131  0  1 
CHURCH ATTENDANCE  40762 3.871  2.456  1  8 
INSTRUMENTS          
INTEREST IN FRIENDS  40885 3.289  0.690  1  4 
INDEX PERCEIVED HONESTY  34478 5.429  1.162  2  8 
CHILDREN  41125 0.077  0.266  0  1 
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